Introduction
Protecting
civilians is the UN's priority objective. Although it is the primary
responsibility of the host state to protect its people, the peacekeepers have a
moral responsibility to protect innocent civilians from the danger and violence
of the conflicts. Most current UN peace operations are mandated to protect
civilians by using all means including the use of force. However, even after
being empowered to use force, the protection of civilians has remained a
challenge. This brief essay aims to examine whether there is a utility in using
force to protect civilians.
Protection
of Civilians and Protection of Civilians (PoC) Mandate
The
PoC mandate in UN peacekeeping is grounded in international laws and provides
legal authority to the peacekeepers.[1]
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UAMIR) was the first mission to
get a mandate to contribute to the security and protection of displaced
persons, refugees, and civilians at risk in Rwanda. But it was only after the
mission was almost withdrawn. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
was the first mission that explicitly authorised the proactive use of force to
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.[2]
Development
of the UN System and Evolution of Use of Force
The application of force to protect
civilians evolved along with the development of the UN System and the evolution
of force from the use of minimum force under Chapter VI to the use of all
necessary means under Chapter VII. The UN which was established as a replacement
for the League of Nations has the authority and responsibility to ensure
international peace and security including using all means under Chapter VII
but does not have any standing peacekeeping force under its command to impose
such an authority. Hence, even though the
UN was expected to plug the gaps in the League, it too had to look to the
member states to contribute troops to both enforce peace and supervise
ceasefire agreements. The UN was conceived on the premise of respecting state
sovereignty as mentioned in the Westphalian System, which was reflected in
Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter.[3]
The UN peacekeeping which incidentally doesn’t find any reference in the UN
Charter, was born out of necessity and established to create conditions for settling
disputes between states peacefully as mentioned in Article 2(3) of the UN
Charter. United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) is the first
peacekeeping mission established on 29 May 1948. Another development of the
post-Cold War world that is critical to the evolution of the use of force is
the UN’s disasters in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
It prompted the UN to recognise the need to formalise PoC as part of the
mandate and the development of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). However, lack
of clarity in the conceptual thinking of the use of force posed a challenge to
operationalising PoC. The Agenda for Peace of 1992
followed by the Brahimi Report and High-Level Independent Panel Report (HIPPO)
brought some clarity to the thinking on using force.[4] The Cruz Report has been strongest in its
opinion about the use of force.[5]
Why
do Peacekeepers hesitate to use force?
PoC
and Principle of Peacekeeping. Amongst the
many challenges that the PoC mandate faces, it seems to act at cross purposes
with the principles of peacekeeping.[6]
The first principle of a peacekeeping operation is consent. But consent
is not absolute, it is conditional, and it would be withdrawn if the conditions
are diluted.[7] At times when against the host states who
might be complicit in the crimes, consent becomes precarious and any action
against the host state might end up with the host state withdrawing its
consent. As an illustration, in July 2016, when the government soldiers of
South Sudan stormed the Terrain Hotel which housed most international civilian
employees and used violence against them, the United Nations Mission in South
Sudan (UNMISS) was found wanting.[8]
The
principle of impartiality is linked to the availability of consent from all
parties to the conflict. Amid conflicts, where there are several parties to
conflict, the UN's impartial stance toward one party may be considered partial
by another party. In a stabilisation mission like the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO), since the mission is in support of the host government, targeting
non-state actors in support of the host state is perceived as partial to the
host state.[9] It
is an ethical dilemma especially when it comes to acting against the host state
because of fear of withdrawal of consent.
The
Security Council authorising ‘use of all necessary means’, under Chapter VII,
has legal implications as it can be interpreted to use even lethal force. Using
lethal force may exaggerate violence (when retaliated by the other side) and
encourage vengeance while reducing the scope of dialogue. Besides this, there
might be some unintended consequences on the peace process, such as
jeopardising other important goals and objectives of the mission; an increase
in cases of peacekeepers abusing their authority and an impact on local HR
situations. That apart, on one hand, it protects civilians and on the other
hand, it increases vulnerability to both peacekeepers and civilians.[10]
Ambiguity
in Phraseology. There is ambiguity in the
interpretation of the use of force.[11]
For example, what does the defence of mandate entail? Does it include
pre-emptive or offensive measures or is there a limit to escalation? What is
the meaning of self-defence and what is the quantum of force that can be
considered as minimum? These are difficult questions to answer. Such ambiguity becomes a restraining factor for UN
Civilian Police (CIVPOL) as well. For example, ‘using all necessary means’ can
be confusing since CIVPOL doesn’t have the executive mandate to arrest and
detain.[12]
Ambiguous PoC Policy. The latest UN policy of 2023 which is an
updated and revised version of the earlier version of the policy of 2019, has
reemphasised the PoC operational concept in three-tier action.[13] Despite that the report
of 2023 is exhaustive and more detailed than the previous one, the peacekeepers
may have a different understanding of the norm. For example, one of the guiding
principles of PoC mandates that the protection of civilians must be fully
consonant with the three principles of peacekeeping. Where there is ambiguity in the understanding
of the principles of peacekeeping, some of the guidelines in the new policy
also become ambiguous. Academicians’ views can also be problematic creating confusion
and resulting in hesitancy in using force by some peacekeepers, ignoring their
moral obligation to protect innocent lives.
Lack of Will and Inadequate Resources. Lack of willingness on
the part of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to accept risks (fall out
of using force) combined with inadequate resources restrain, peacekeepers from
using force proactively. When the density of peacekeepers is thin, the strategy
of deterrence by the threat to use force or the strategy of pre-emption to
provide passive protection does not work, and it becomes difficult to garner
force to match the violence properly.[14]
PoC vs R2P. The concept of PoC and R2P are both grounded
in the need to protect civilians. Therefore, both are linked and have
similarities.[15]
On the other hand, R2P is a political principle designed to prevent genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The complex
relationship generates debates and controversies and a lack of understanding of
the difference poses a challenge to when operationalising PoC.
Utility of the Use of Force to Protect Civilians
Despite the challenges in
using force to protect civilians, there are instances of commanders using force
to protect civilians. The first example dates to as early as the 1990s, much
before the PoC had become the core objective of the UN. In Srebrenica, in
December 1993, one platoon of Swedish Danish Norwegian Mechanised Battalion (NORDBAT
2), despite being heavily outnumbered by a Croatian battalion-size force,
refused to hand over two Muslim nurses to the Croats for more than 12
hours. In another one out of many
incidents in South Sudan, when an internal communal clash broke out in Malakal
on 18 February 2014, Indian peacekeepers, disregarding their safety positioned
themselves in between armed groups and prevailed upon to find a solution using
means other than violence. There must be many more
such examples of peacekeepers using force to protect civilians. These two
examples show that regardless of formal authorisation of the use of force to
protect civilians, peacekeepers can use all necessary means to protect the
civilians to fulfil their moral obligation.
Conclusion
Even
much before the PoC formally became part of the mandate (explicitly authorising
proactive use of force) for UN peace operations from the time of UNAMSIL PoC
was inherent in the mandate because it is the moral responsibility of the
peacekeeper to save civilians. Operational
military commanders at tactical levels don’t have the luxury of self-education
about the prevailing rules and regulations like the academicians and policy
makers. In battle, there are fleeting moments when the commanders must make
quick life-and-death decisions that need to be informed by International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) compliance. When the peacekeepers follow the
fundamental principles of the IHL: Humanity,
Distinction, Proportionality and Military Necessity, and think on their
feet to make informed decisions, using force to protect civilians will be in
good faith.[16]
Unless commanders at tactical levels are constantly
reminded of their moral responsibility and encouraged to take the initiative to
protect the ones in danger and states make it their obligation to protect the
protectors, innocent civilians will continue to suffer.
Endnotes
[1] “Policy:
The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping,” UN Department of Peace
Operations, Ref.2023.05, May 1, 2023.
[2] UN, S/RES/1289 (2000) 7
February 2000
[3] Steven Patton,
"The Peace of Westphalia and its Affects on International Relations,
Diplomacy and Foreign Policy," The Histories, Vol. 10 No.1 Article
5,2019,
https://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/the_histories/vol10/iss1/5
[4] UN General
Assembly Security Council, Agenda for Peace, A/47/277 – S/24111 (June
17, 1992); UN General Assembly, Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (August 21, 2000); United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, 2008), pp. 31 and High Level Independent Panel Report
A/70/95–S/2015/446, 17 June 2015
[5] Lieutenant General
(Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, “Improving Security of United Nations
Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing
business,” December 19, 2017, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf. Also see, Paul D
Williams, “Cruz Report: The Politics of Force and the United Nations’ Peacekeeping
Trilemma,” February 9, 2018,
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/02/cruz-report-peacekeeping-trilemma/
[6] United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, 2008), pp. 31.
[7] “Host-Country
Consent in UN Peacekeeping: Bridging the Gap between Principle and Practice,”
Peacekeeping, Stimson, September 8, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/host-country-consent-in-un-peacekeeping-bridging-the-gap-between-principle-and-practice/. Also
see, Anjali Dayal, “A Crisis of Consent in UN Peace Operations,” IPI Global
Observatory, August 2, 2022, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/08/a-crisis-of-consent-in-un-peace-operations/
[8] Lauren
Spink and Matt Wells, “Under Fire: The July 2016 Violence in Juba and UN
Response,” Centre for Civilians in Conflict, October 5, 2016, https://civiliansinconflict.org/publications/research/fire-july-2016-violence-juba-un-response;
“ UN: Rape used as a tool for ethnic cleansing in South Sudan,” CBS News, December
2, 2016, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/united-nations-says-rape-used-as-tool-for-ethnic-cleansing-in-south-sudan/
[9] UN
Security Council Resolution, S/RES/2666 (2022), December 20, 2022. For more
details on stabilisation, please see Cedric de Coning, “Is stabilization the
new normal? Implications of stabilization mandates for the use of force in UN
peace operations,” in The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping (1st ed.) ed.
Peter Nadin (London: Routledge, 2018).
[10] For details of
casualty to peacekeepers, see. UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2589
(2021), August 18, 2021
[11] A K Bardalai, “UN
Peacekeeping and Ambiguity in Normative UN Norms,” Manohar Parrikar
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal of Defence Studies, Vol.
16, No. 3, July–September 2022, pp. 3–31
[12] Charles
T. Hunt, “To serve and protect: The
changing roles of police in the protection of civilians in UN peace
operations,” Civil Wars, September 21, 2022, DOI:
10.1080/13698249.2022.2119507
[13] “Policy: The
Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping,” UN Department of Peace
Operations, Ref.2023.05, May 1, 2023. Also see, “The Protection
of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping”, The UN Department of Peace
Operations, Ref. 2019.17. November 1, 2019
[14] Stian
Kjeksrud, “Utility of Force to Protect Civilians from Violence: Violence:
Exploring Outcomes of United
Nations Military Protection Operations in Africa
(1999–2017),” Civil
Wars,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2023.2222058
[15] “Policy: The
Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping,” UN Department of Peace
Operations, Ref.2023.05, May 1, 2023.
[16] For more
details on the Fundamental Principles of IHL, see, https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl
Major General AK Bardalai (retd) is a former peacekeeper and currently a Distinguished Fellow of the United Services Institute of India. He holds a PhD in UN Peace Operations from The Tilburg University, the Netherlands.
Disclaimer: Views expressed in the article are of the author and do not
represent any organisation or institution
Article uploaded : 17-11-2023
Disclaimer : The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he/she belongs to or of the USI of India.